

Director of Basic Intelligence

17 March 1966

Chief, Cartography Division, OBI

CIA Attribution on Maps


1. In evaluating the question of putting CIA as a credit line on all maps, charts and other graphics produced by the Cartography Division, it is necessary to review the background of the existing policy. Many times since World War II Division policy has been changed to reflect higher-up policy changes relative to the control and dissemination of Agency production. In essence the question each time the problem has arisen has been, "Does the Agency want to advertise its product, and how extensively?" The answer has usually been, "As much as possible within the bounds of security." The Division has always recognized the desirability of a broad dissemination of its unique maps through the Intelligence Community and outside of Government, particularly the academic field, but Agency security has been an inhibiting factor. Maps are a medium of intelligence dissemination as are reports. Each is a definitive, explicit story easily interpreted and presented in a universal language. Therefore, our maps, used in all kinds of reports, operations, briefings; in short a broad spectrum of Agency activities, whether classified or not, can reveal a wealth of information on the interests and activities of the Agency.

2. The policy guidelines resulting from these reviews have usually been a compromise between Division desires and security requirements, and the policy existing today represents the best balance attainable. Simply stated that policy is as follows:

Identification:

- a. All maps and graphics are identified by a serial number and month and year in lower right corner of map.
- b. All classified graphics have the date followed by "CIA."
- c. Unclassified graphics do not have the CIA credit.

There are special exceptions to the above in that OOI has requested no credit line on certain productions we do for them, and frequently the credit line is deleted from graphics produced for operational and briefing purposes.



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Distribution:

a. The Division exercises complete control over the quantity of printed copy and its distribution. The Division determines, in consultation with the requester, whether or not distribution of the graphics beyond the needs of the report is required.

b. Actual distribution, whether "limited" or "general" is made by the Map Library of OBI. In some instances the requester receives copy which he distributes. Copy sent to the Map Library with a limited designation cannot be distributed or shown to anyone without the expressed consent of the Division. Distribution control of all other copy is the exclusive responsibility of the Map Library. The Cartography Division assumes "regular" maps will be distributed widely to anyone in the world. This is particularly true of unclassified maps which the library routinely distributes to embassies, the world-wide exchange collection program, and many agencies of the Government such as USIA, AID, State, etc. Out of the unclassified maps produced each month, the Division releases selected general purpose maps for filing in the Library of Congress.

c. Maps and graphics produced by the All-Source Branch in the Special Center, code word or otherwise, are distributed under special controls by the Map Library Division. Because of limited printing facilities---nearly all are printed in the Special Center reproduction plant---only small quantities are available for distribution. All of the classified graphics produced in CD/X, except where requested not to do so, are accredited to the Agency. Unclassified materials do not carry the credit line.

d. It should be pointed out that Cartography Division production, particularly maps, is a unique contribution to the Intelligence Community in that no other Government agency produces a like product. Our thematic map bases are admirably adapted to illustrating intelligence reports and are used widely in the Community both in printed copy and in reproducible plate separation forms.

3. Arguments for and against identifying our production with the Agency, as mentioned earlier, have been reviewed many time. The following summarizes our past feelings:

Arguments For:

a. Crediting our production to CIA would add to the prestige of the Agency. Attribution on our graphics would denote the authority for the data shown. When associated directly with the text, this is not significant, but when distributed independent of the text, the prestige of the Agency and its resources adds to the veracity of the content.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

b. It is right and proper that graphics used to portray the activities of the Agency, such as briefing boards, vu-graphs, maps, charts, etc., be identified. This is particularly true for high-level briefings and graphics which are kept within the Intelligence Community. It is important that CIA receive credit for its intelligence production the same as DIA and other intelligence agencies.

c. It is desirable to identify all Office of Basic Intelligence production.

Arguments against:

a. Because many of the unclassified maps now distributed under existing rules divulge the interests and activities of the Agency, the addition of a credit line denoting the identity of the producer would be unwise from a security standpoint. As it is the identity of the producer is not known to those recipients throughout the world who may have access to our maps through the embassies and other regular Map Library distribution channels.

b. To identify CIA produced maps places the stamp of authority and responsibility for the data portrayed. Along with taking credit is the responsibility to supply sources from which the data has been taken. At times, by the very nature of the research effort which frequently involves classified information, answering requests of this nature could be extremely embarrassing.

c. Since all production in the Cartography Division is identified by number and date, recipients are provided with a fairly revealing means of determining what is being done in CIA and at the precise time. Since our unclassified maps are widely used in the Government---in NIS, ONE, Department of State publications, DIA, even AID and USIA---the factor of security becomes significant.

d. To identify our maps would create a variety of problems in various other agencies in Government. Exceptions would have to be made to those going into Department of State publications. The DD/P uses them for briefing people going into the field and in interrogating defectors and other contacts. Frequently, they are used in DD/P operations which is one reason PSD uses unwatermarked paper for map printing. Our unclassified maps are used for exchange purposes in the joint map procurement efforts of IANPCC.

e. By the nature of unclassified publications our maps are frequently listed on accession lists prepared by other libraries inside and outside Government. Such listing is beyond the control of the Cartography Division and the Map Library Division.

SECRET

- 4 -

f. As mentioned earlier, many of the unclassified maps are released to the Library of Congress for inclusion in their map files. These files are available, with some restriction and control, to the public. As now controlled, the Agency is not identified as the producer.

g. As more CIA produced maps become available, more people would want to see CIA production, and not only is this undesirable, but the added burden of making, filing and distributing copy would increase manpower and material costs appreciably. We print and distribute a limited number of copies, very seldom exceeding 2500, tailored on the capabilities of our reproduction plants and the staffing/storage resources of MID/BI.

25X1X1

25X1C4a

4. Conclusions and Recommendations:

a. In evaluating the foregoing reasons for and against identifying unclassified CIA maps, it is very difficult to arrive at a precise policy which the Agency should follow. The desire to publicize CIA production, as well as make its unclassified research available to non-Government research activities, is in conflict with the security requirements and considerations inherent in an intelligence agency.

b. The system in effect today is a compromise of these conflicting aims. The system is an outgrowth of day-to-day experiences of professional cartographers, geographers and librarians, who take great pride in their work and desire recognition for the Agency, yet recognize the importance of security requirements. In their judgment security considerations outweighed the advantages attribution would promote.

c. The Cartography Division does not recommend a change in the present policy. In our judgment a change of policy would require relaxing security with no more benefit to the Agency than prestigious recognition of a relatively minor portion of the Division's

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79-01153A000100050034-9

- 5 -

production. By virtue of all classified maps being accredited, the Intelligence Community is cognizant of our work and by association can generally identify our unclassified production. The controls instituted by the Map Library permits the maximum distribution of unclassified production throughout the Government and selected non-Government agencies. Attribution would in fact have an adverse affect on its distribution policies.

25X1A9a


Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79-01153A000100050034-9

SECRET